On August 30, 2024, amid the Israeli aggression on Lebanon, Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced that Lebanon joined the Saudi-led Middle East Green Initiative (MGI), describing the step as crucial, especially for southern border towns and villages that are suffering significant environmental and agricultural damage. The premier added that the destruction of productive land, fruit-bearing trees, and forests necessitates cooperation with all of Lebanon’s allies.¹While the full extent of destruction can only be assessed after a ceasefire is reached, a recent World Bank report estimates that the cost of damage to Lebanon’s agriculture and environment sectors between October 8, 2023—one day after the start of the war in Gaza—and September 27, 2024, amounts to USD 245 million, with losses exceeding USD 1.3 billion.²

Lebanon’s endorsement of the MGI aligns with the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment policy of rehabilitating and increasing Lebanon’s vegetation cover.³ Launched in March 2021, this regional initiative conforms to Saudi Vision 2030, which focuses on diversifying the economy away from oil dependence and fostering sustainable development. It calls for planting 50 billion trees and establishing joint reserves across the Middle East, aiming to reduce carbon emissions and promote climate adaptation.⁴ As of October 14, 2024, 29 countries and international organizations have endorsed the MGI, including regional member countries and non-regional contributors.⁵

Israel is not formally part of the MGI as the ongoing war in Gaza has disrupted its normalization negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, Israel’s diplomatic and economic relations with some Arab countries that have endorsed the initiative—namely Egypt and Jordan, both of which have peace treaties with Israel, as well as countries that signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 (Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE])—raise questions about cross-border environmental cooperation in the context of regional wars and conflicts. This article sheds light on the current dynamics of environmental cooperation between Israel and Arab countries. It offers insights into how Israel leverages climate change and environmental rhetoric to advance its regional political and economic interests, while simultaneously harming the environment and seeking greater control over the land and water resources of its neighbors. Based on this argument, the article calls for action to criminalize Israel's war leaders for their “ecocide” in Lebanon and Gaza. 

Israel’s environmental cooperation with Arab countries takes various forms and approaches. It can be direct or indirect, through third-party organizations or international frameworks. At the policy level, several regional environmental agreements that promote multilateral cooperation on shared challenges have been endorsed by Israel and Arab countries, including some that are officially in conflict with Israel. These include long-standing agreements such as the Mediterranean Action Plan, established in 1975; the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, adopted in1976; and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), founded in 2008. Israel and Arab countries are also party to several regional environmental platforms, such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), initiated by Egypt in 2018 to support collaboration in the gas sector, and potentially in renewable energy;⁶ the Eastern Mediterranean & Middle East Climate Change Initiative (EMME CCI), launched in 2019 by the Cypriot government;⁷ and the Middle East and North Africa Climate Week (MENACW), first held in 2022 in the UAE under UN patronage.⁸

Significantly, the Abraham Accords have paved the way for direct discussions on shared environmental concerns between Israel and Arab countries that have normalized relations with it. Such dialogue is already underway through the Negev Forum, established in March 2022 by Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, to strengthen cooperation on issues such as security, climate change, health, energy, and water.⁹In practice, environmental cooperation has been most effective with Morocco and the UAE, where public opposition to relations with Israel is minimal. Environmental cooperation with Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain—where strong public opposition to Israel persists despite diplomatic and economic ties—has been more challenging.¹⁰ Notably, in December 2020, Israel and Morocco signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) focusing on technical cooperation in water management. Likewise, in October 2022, Israel, Jordan, and the UAE signed an MoU on a water-for-energy swap, which involves solar energy production in Jordan, water desalination in Israel, and support from the UAE. Meanwhile, collaboration between Egypt and Jordan is primarily focused on the natural gas sector, as Israel exports natural gas to both countries and supplies Europe via Egypt’s facilities. 

Environmental challenges and climate change present an opportunity for Israel to strengthen ties with Arab states that currently have diplomatic relations with it as well as with those that do not, particularly the Gulf states.¹¹ For example, although Saudi Arabia has not normalized relations with Israel, the 2023 announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor—which passes through Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—has paved the way for future environmental collaboration among participating countries, particularly in the renewable energy sector.¹² The growing recognition of the importance of collaborative efforts in addressing regional challenges, and the Israeli private sector’s financial interests in the Gulf, suggests a strong potential for expanding and formalizing the exchanges that have thus far occurred in international forums.¹³

Political and geopolitical factors, along with domestic governance challenges, obstruct possible indirect environmental cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, primarily Lebanon and Palestine, with whom it is in active conflict. From an Israeli perspective, however, such indirect cooperation can be an opportunity to “foster regional stability, maintain and expand circles of peace and normalization, and increase prosperity and economic development”.¹⁴ Given the lack of sufficient financial resources to address environmental and climate challenges, Israeli officials count on the international community, particularly the US and Europe, for funding. They also consider international support crucial for creating mutual interests in de-escalation and cooperation, especially in fostering trust between Israelis and Palestinians.¹⁵ 

To be sure, current regional wars and conflicts cast serious doubt on views that consider environmental cooperation a viable means of promoting regional stability, peace, and economic prosperity. Israel's military operations in Gaza and Lebanon, supported by funding from the U.S. and several European countries, undermine prospects for collaboration, even if it is only indirect. Below are three entry points intended to contribute to a critical debate and stimulate further research on this topic.

Israel is using climate action and environmental discourse to assert itself as a leading regional power. It is working to align the environmental and climate-related needs of neighboring countries with its own strengths and expand its role in regional initiatives. The establishment of the Israeli Climate Forum in October 2021 aimed to position Israel “at the forefront of the global debate about the climate crisis” and promote inter-ministerial, regional, and international collaboration in addressing this challenge.¹⁶ The Negev forum and the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC held in the Middle East (COP27 in Egypt in 2022 and COP28 in the UAE in 2023) have provided Israel with regional and international platforms to promote itself as a leader in regional climate resilience, in compliance with the vision for a “Renewable Middle East” that Israel’s President Isaac Herzog presented at COP27.¹⁷

By positioning itself as a key player in climate and environmental matters, Israel seeks to strongly partake in, if not lead, discussions on the future of the region’s natural resources.¹⁸ Israel is also trying to enhance its share of climate finance and establish a strong foothold in the global carbon trading market.¹⁹ Given the unequal regional power dynamics and Israel’s technological advancements, it is not inconceivable that Israel and its allies could establish new forms of colonialism over the region’s natural resources, under the guise of a vision for a “Renewable Middle East” or in the name of a green future and food security. This issue becomes more critical when global actors and international funding organizations conflate environmental rhetoric with neoliberal agendas that facilitate the privatization of natural resources and reduce the decision-making power of weaker countries and groups in managing their resources,²⁰ eventually diminishing their autonomy and subordinating them to Israel's influence.

Israel’s rhetoric on potential cross-border environmental cooperation conflicts with the scorched earth policy it has pursued in its wars on Gaza and Lebanon over the past year. Several scholars and commentators contend that Israel is waging a war against the environment in Gaza, with some arguing it constitutes the biggest case of ecological destruction, or “ecocide”, in recent history.²¹ While it involves “less visible and slower forms of violence” than its military assaults,²² this ecocide amounts to a war crime that has far-reaching implications for ecosystems, communities, and future generations.²³ Concurrently, Israel’s destruction of the environment in Gaza is aggravating the global ecological and climate crisis. A newly published study estimates that the total carbon emissions from direct combat activities in Gaza between October 2023 and February 2024 were between 420,265 and 652,552 tonnes, which is higher than the annual emission from at least 26 countries.²⁴  

The scale of environmental devastation inflicted by Israel in Lebanon is also daunting. Between October 8, 2023 and September 12, 2024, in the southern governorates of Lebanon alone, Israel has destroyed approximately 1,879 hectares of prime farmland, more than 47,000 olive trees, and around 1,200 hectares of oak forests.²⁵ Israel’s military operations have also sparked deadly fires in natural reserves and ecologically sensitive areas.²⁶ The attacks even targeted the main water supply route and irrigation system of South Lebanon.²⁷Furthermore, Israel’s use of white phosphorus and incendiary bombs has harmed grasslands and croplands, devastated livestock, and contaminated irrigation water and the soil, resulting in significant damage to the agricultural sector. Crucially, the infiltration of white phosphorus into groundwater and aquifers poses a serious environmental risk that can disrupt ecosystems, threaten food security, affect human health, and undermine the local economy.²⁸Additionally, Israel’s razing of entire Lebanese villages located close to major fault lines increases the risk of human-induced earthquakes.²⁹

Israel’s brutal military actions in Lebanon and Gaza are driven by its ideological aim to establish a Greater Israel and its economic interest in controlling the land and water resources of its neighbors.³⁰ Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine began by the expulsion of the Palestinians from their land and their subsequent dehumanization. Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank are confined in enclosed enclaves surrounded by separation walls, barbed wire barriers, and checkpoints. Meanwhile, Israel continues to use Israeli law to “legalize” existing settlements deemed unlawful under international law, and to plan and allocate land for new settlements that encroach on Palestinian territories and erode Palestinian cultural heritage—actions that the UN has condemned as alarming and in clear violation of international law.³¹

During his September 22, 2023, address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented a map of "The New Middle East" that does not include Palestine, implying that it is part of Israel.³² The inclusion of lands belonging to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and a small part of Turkey in Israeli maps of Greater Israel is also common, reflecting the ultra-nationalist Zionist belief in ownership of these territories.³³ Over and above, Israel has ambitions in the waters of its neighboring Arab countries. It exercises control over the waters of the West Bank and Gaza and has also gained control of some of the main sources of Jordan and Syria (the upper Jordan River basin and Yarmouk River basin).³⁴ Israel considers southern Lebanon’s water sources essential for sustaining agriculture, industry, and energy generation in its northern regions. Its ambitions in the waters of the Litani River, Lebanon’s longest river, has been a longstanding issue.³⁵Israel has historically obstructed projects aimed at supporting Lebanon to benefit from this river.³⁶ It has also reportedly drawn water from the Wazzani and Hasbani rivers and diverted it to Israel, despite Lebanon’s objections.³⁷

In essence, “Israel is not fighting a war of self-defense. It is fighting to occupy more territory to strengthen its apartheid apparatus and tighten its control on Palestinian people and the region.”³⁸ Its systematic land and water grabbing plan, intentional acts of environmental destruction, and scorched earth policies not only undermine the rights and livelihoods of local populations but also exacerbate ecological damage and destroy everything capable of sustaining life for generations to come. Israeli-Arab cross-border environmental cooperation is unlikely to serve as a viable path to peace in the Middle East amidst these offences.

On November 21, 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Gaza.³⁹ The ICC’s ruling came after several steps, culminating in a referral regarding the Situation in the State of Palestine submitted by South Africa and six other nations to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.⁴⁰ On another level, UN experts and governmental and civil society representatives have accused Israel of committing a genocide and urged the UN to consider suspending Israel’s credentials as a member state, emphasizing the importance of calling “a genocide a genocide”.⁴¹ Notably, genocide has been recognized as a crime under international criminal law since 1951. 

In a similar vein, it is important to recognize Israel’s environmental crimes in Lebanon and Gaza as ecocide. First proposed in 1970 by biology professor Arthur W. Galston, in protest of the U.S. military’s use of the herbicide and chemicals to destroy foliage and crops during the Vietnam War, the concept of ecocide has since gained support by many civil society organizations and legal experts advocating for its criminalization. Of course, it is possible to say that warfare, by its fundamental nature, causes damage to both the built environment and the natural environment. However, this cannot justify the deliberate targeting of natural assets, cultural landscapes, and protected natural sites.⁴² International humanitarian law prohibts such actions, primarily under Articles 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.⁴³ Additionally, the Rome Statute of the ICC, adopted on July 17, 1998, recognizes deliberate environmental destruction committed during wartime that cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment” as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv).⁴⁴

Legal experts acknowledge gaps within international criminal law but argue that it remains the appropriate framework to prosecute environmental crimes. Advocacy efforts aim to enlist ecocide, or crimes against the environment, as a “fifth crime” under international criminal law—alongside the four “core” international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Advocates are also working to expand legal accountability for environmental harm, holding individuals and corporations accountable for their actions in both wartime and peacetime. Significant progress has been made, with Pacific Island states recently proposing the recognition of ecocide as an international crime before the ICC.⁴⁵

 

Continued advocacy to include ecocide as a distinct crime in international criminal law is particularly pressing given the severe environmental harm caused by Israel’s military action in Lebanon and Gaza. Without punitive action against Israel’s crimes, regional environmental cooperation efforts —including Saudi Arabia’s Middle East Green Initiative, endorsed by both Lebanon and Palestine—may only entrench existing power imbalances and exacerbate social and environmental injustices. Thus, while environmental degradation and habitat destruction are current consequences of Israel’s environmental offences, they could also become drivers of future conflicts as impacted communities face resource pollution, extraction, depletion, and other cascading effects of unchecked ecological harm. Post-war environmental abuses, disguised as efforts towards reconstruction, peacebuilding, and promises of a resilient and sustainable future, could further intensify both environmental and humanitarian crises. Therefore, establishing appropriate legal mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable for environmental crimes, both during warfare and in its aftermath, is of utmost importance.